Predicting the reliability of electronic circuits. by Loescher, Douglas H.
0 
a 
a 
SAND20042377 C.2 
REFERENCE COPY 
and Livermore, Califor 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
TOTAL PAGES: 22 
Issued by Sandia National Laboratories, operated for the United States Department of Energy by 
Sandia Corporation. 
NOTICE: This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United 
States Government. Neither the United States Government, nor any agency thereof, nor any of 
their employees, nor any of their contractors, subcontractors, or their employees, make any 
warranty, express or implied, or assume any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, 
completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or 
represent that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific 
commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, 
does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the 
United States Government, any agency thereof, or any of their contractors or subcontractors. The 
views and opinions expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States 
Government, any agency thereof, or any of their contractors. 
Printed in the United States of America. This report has been reproduced directly from the best 
available copy. 
Available to DOE and DOE contractors from 
U.S. Department of Energy 
Office of Scientific and Technical Information 
P.O. Box 62 
Oak Ridge, TN 37831 
Telephone: (865)576-8401 
Facsimile: (865)576-5728 
E-Mail: rePorts@,adonis.osti.gov 
Online ordering: h@://www.osti.govhridge 
Available to the public from 
U.S. Department of Commerce 
National Technical Information Service 
5285 Port Royal Rd 
Springfield, VA 22 161 
Telephone: (800)553-6847 
Facsimile: (703)605-6900 
E-Mail: orders@,ntis.fedworld.gov 
Online order: ht~://www.ntis.govlhel~/ordermethods.as~?1oc=7-4-0#online 
2 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
e 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
e 
0 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
0 
a 
SAND2004-23 77 
Unlimited Release 
Printed June 2004 
Predicting the Reliability of Electronic Circuits 
Douglas H. Loescher 
Reliability Assessment and Human Factors Department, 12335 
Sandia National Laboratories 
P.O. Box 5800 
Albuquerque, NM 87185-0830 
LIBRARY DOCUMENT 
DO MOT DESTROY 
RETURN T O  
LIBRARY VAULT 
Abstract 
Procedures to predict the reliability of electrical circuits are discussed. Three cases are 
introduced and discussed. In Case 1, an analyst predicts the probability of any failure in 
the intended relations between circuit inputs and circuit outputs. In Case 2, an analyst 
predicts the probability that specified unintended outputs would occur. In Case 3, an 
analyst considers coupling between circuits. Logic models are given for the three cases, 
and sources of failure probabilities of components are mentioned. Methods of analysis 
are given, software tools are mentioned, and recommendations for presentation and 
review of results are discussed. 
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Introduction 
Part of the work assigned to reliability specialists is the prediction of the reliability of 
electronic circuits and assemblies. There are requests for predictions of the probability 
that a circuit will work as intended and for predictions that a circuit might provide 
incorrect, unintended, or unsafe outputs. Developers of firing sets for weapons need 
predictions of the probability that their firing sets will provide current to fire detonators. 
Designers of telemetry circuits need predictions of the probability that a circuit will 
provide a misleading output. This report discusses the methodologies used to calculate 
predictions of failure probability from circuit designs. 
When asked for a prediction of the reliability of an electronic circuit, an analyst must 
resolve at least four issues: 
(1) What constitutes success and what constitutes failure. 
(2) How to construct a failure probability model of the circuit, with circuit failure 
(3) How to assign failure probabilities to the underlying events in the model. 
(4) How to obtain and review estimates of failure probability once a model has been 
constructed and component failure probabilities have been obtained. 
represented as the logical outcome of underlying failure events. 
These four issues are the topics of this report. 
Types of Failures 
Three types of failure, arbitrarily called Case 1, Case 2, and Case 3, are defined because 
they require somewhat different models and analyses. 
Case 1 usually applies when the analyst is asked to estimate the probability that a circuit 
will not perform its intended function when given proper inputs. Case 1 failure occurs if 
the circuit outputs do not respond as intended to changes in circuit inputs, but the circuit 
failure does not adversely affect other circuits. Failures that adversely affect other 
circuits are considered in Case 3. As an example of Case 1, consider the simple series 
connection of a power source, a switch, and a light bulb shown in Figure 1. Input to the 
circuit is movement of the switch handle, and output is light from the bulb. Circuit 
success occurs if, when the source supplies power within specified limits, the light goes 
on when the switch is closed and goes off when the switch is opened. Failure occurs 
when the source supplies power within specified limits, but either the light does not go on 
when the switch is closed or it does not go off when the switch is opened. Note the need 
to specify the presence of power. 
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Handle 
r-++-, Switch 
Power A 
source 
Figure 1. A simple circuit with a power source, a 
switch, and light bulb is shown. 
Case 2 usually applies when the analyst is asked to estimate the probability that a circuit 
will have a premature or unsafe response. Case 2 failure occurs if the circuit output is not 
as intended for some, but not necessarily all, inputs and the circuit does not draw so much 
current as to affect other circuits. For example, Case 2 would apply if the task were to 
estimate the probability that an instrumentation circuit would provide incorrect indication 
that an event has occurred. Consider again the simple circuit shown in Figure 1, but now 
suppose that failure is defined to be light on when the switch is open and the power 
source is supplyingpower. Failure would occur if the switch were stuck in the closed 
position, if a conductor bridged the switch contacts, or if there were an unintended 
connection between the light and the source of power. 
Case 2 failures are often a subset of all failures. However, sometimes the set of possible 
failures is increased to include unintentional contact between conductors or contact with 
conductors external to the circuit. For example, such failures are often included in safety 
analyses. 
Case 3 applies if a fault in the circuit under study adversely affects operation of other 
circuits. Coupling could occur in many ways. For example, a fault could result in an 
overload on system power supplies or an overload on a system clock. Let a night-light 
and an alarm clock be plugged into the same household circuit. Failure of the night-light 
as a short circuit would lead to opening of a fuse or circuit breaker and loss of power to 
the alarm clock. An analyst should determine if coupling between circuits is possible and 
if it is important. A Case 3 analysis is often complex because of the coupling between 
circuits. Such analyses are not discussed further in this report. 
Every failure does not fit perfectly into one of these three categories. Even so, they prove 
useful. It is not unusual during an analysis to refine definitions of faults and add faults 
that were overlooked. 
Models 
This section discusses the translation from descriptions of an electric circuit to reliability 
models. Electric circuits are described by lists of parts and by schematics that show how 
the parts are interconnected. Sometimes the circuit designer specifies physical layout, but 
often this is left to the discretion of assemblers. The procedure used to go from a parts 
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list or a schematic to a reliability model depends on whether the analyst is modeling Case 
1, Case 2, or Case 3 failure types. Consider Case 1 first. 
Case 1 is often the easiest to model. The author’s experience and that of many other 
analysts is that for most circuits there will be a Case 1 failure, if any part fails.’ This does 
not mean that failure will occur if any resistor or other component has a value slightly 
different from that shown on the schematic. Circuits are designed to work with 
components that have values in expected ranges. However, circuit failure in the Case 1 
sense is likely if any component has a value far from the specified value. Open circuits 
and short circuits are far from the expected value for most components. The logic model 
for Case 1 is the Inclusive OR of the failure of every component in the circuit. To the 
extent that the model is correct and that component failures are independent, the Case 1 
failure probability for a circuit is given by equation 1 in which f, is the failure probability 
for a circuit made up of m components, each with failure probabilities fi: 
Eq. 1 
If all products of two or more fi’s are small compared to any fi, then Equation 1 may 
written as 
m 
f c  Z C f i  Eq. 2 
i=l 
The rn components include all items that the analyst decides belong in the model. For 
example, the analyst may include interconnect wires or account for interconnects 
otherwise. Sometimes it is necessary to take into account failure of solder joints, failure 
of substrates, and failure due to unintended connections. The first of these is often 
included in the failure probabilities for piece parts, the second may or may not be a 
significant contributor to the failure probability, and the third is not usually considered in 
Case 1 analyses. Substrate breakage can be a significant contributor to failure for hybrid 
microcircuits that are assembled on ceramic substrates and that are subjected to 
significant shock or vibration, but may not be a significant failure mode for circuits on 
resin-laminate circuit boards. In each instance, the analyst must decide what failure 
modes to include in the model. The assumption that components fail independently of 
each other is not restrictive because, in the model, the first failure of any component 
results in circuit failure. It is frequently the case that failure of one component will lead 
to failure of other components. However, the fact that a string of failures occurs does not 
change the fact that the circuit failed when the first failure occurred. 
Implicit in the use of a logical OR failure model is the assumption that the actual 
electrical circuit and the mechanical layout of parts are unimportant except as they affect 
the failure probabilities of individual components. Also implicit are the assumptions that 
Remember that Case 1 failure occurs if even one of the intended relationships between inputs and outputs 
fails. 
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there are no redundant parts or unnecessary parts. These latter two assumptions are 
usually justified because designers of electrical circuits do not usually insert redundant 
parts to improve circuit reliability, nor do they put in unnecessary parts. However, 
exceptions occur. The author analyzed safety-critical circuits in which two voltage- 
limiting diodes were connected in parallel solely to increase the protection against over 
voltage and a nuclear weapon component in which the two relays were connected in 
parallel to increase the likelihood that power would be supplied to a circuit. The author 
has also seen circuits used in Sandia-designed equipment that contain parts that are 
unnecessary for weapon function, but are needed for monitoring. The circuit shown in 
Figure 2 illustrates the use of component for monitoring. The circuit is the same as the 
one shown in Figure 1 except that a resistor buffered test port has been added. The 
resistor is not needed for the primary function of the circuit, which is to turn on and turn 
off the light. The circuit will perform these functions independent of the value of the 
monitor resistor if the test port terminates in an open circuit. However, if the functions of 
the circuit were expanded to include the monitor function, then an open circuit or high 
resistance at the monitor resistor would lead to Case 1 failure. The example illustrates 
the need for preciseness in the definition of circuit function and circuit failure. 
Component 
Capacitor 
Transformer 
Resistor 
Test Port 
Number Failure Probability Contribution 
3 fC 3 fc 
1 fX , 1fx 
4 fR 4fR 
Power 
source 
Transis tor 
Total Failure Probability 
Figure 2. The simple circuit shown in Figure 1 
with a test port added is shown. 
2 fQ 2 fQ 
3 fC+4fR+fX+2fQ 
For illustration, suppose the task is to estimate the probability of a Case 1 failure of a 
circuit for which the list of parts shows three capacitors of the same type, four resistors of 
the same type, two field effect transistors of the same type, and one transformer. A 
Case 1 reliability analysis might be done as shown in Table 1. It is common practice to 
use C to indicate a capacitor, Q to indicate a transistor, R to indicate a resistor, and X to 
indicate a transformer. The determination of failure rates and failure probabilities is 
discussed later in this report. 
Table 1. Example of a Case 1 Reliability Analysis. It is assumed that Eq. 2 applies. 
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Case 2 failure occurs when an output is incorrect in some specified way. For example, 
the voltage at an output may be stuck high, or an instrumentation circuit may indicate that 
an event occurred without the intended inputs from sensors. Many times, the Case 2 
failure of interest is a member of the set of events that defines Case 1 failure. For the 
circuit shown in Figure 1, a Case 2 failure might be light on, independent of switch 
position. If the Case 2 failure is included in the set of Case 1 failures, the logical OR 
model with all parts considered will provide an upper bound on the failure rate if other 
failure modes do not need to be considered. If the calculated bound is acceptable, there 
may be no reason to do a more detailed analysis. More analysis will be required if the 
bound is unacceptably large or if additional failure modes need to be considered. 
The possibility of other failure modes is a particular issue in analyses to determine the 
probability of unsafe response. Unsafe response might be the result of component 
failures, but it might also be the result of short circuits between wiring or due to other 
faults. Unintended interconnection of wiring is not usually included in models for Case 1 
because the contribution to failure probability is usually much less than other 
contributions. However, such a fault may be major contributor to the probability that a 
circuit provides an unsafe or unintended output. 
The reliability model for a Case 3 failure has to take into account the possibility that 
failure in one circuit will cause failure in other circuits. Models for such failure are 
specific to each system and can be quite complex. They are not covered further in this 
report. 
Application, Environment, and Operating Conditions 
The analyst has to take into account thermal, mechanical, and electrical stressors that 
strongly affect the life of components. For most electrical components, life decreases 
rapidly as operating temperature increases. For example, the life of silicon 
semiconductor components decreases by about a factor of ten for each 27 C increase in 
junction temperature. It is not enough to know the ambient temperature. For 
semiconductor components it is necessary to know or to estimate junction temperature. 
For most other components, it will be adequate to know or to estimate internal 
temperature. For circuits in dormant storage, junction temperatures and internal 
temperatures will be the same as the ambient temperature unless heating or cooling is 
present. For operating circuits, junction temperature or internal temperature will be 
higher than the temperature inside a circuit enclosure, which will itself be higher than the 
ambient temperature. The total difference between ambient temperature and junction or 
internal temperature can exceed 100 "C for components that dissipate large amounts of 
power. 
Life of solder joints decreases due to metal fatigue as the severity and frequency of 
temperature cycling increase. At the time this report was written, R. Wavrik in the 
Advanced Packaging Department (1 745) was using software to evaluate thermal- 
mechanical stresses on solder joints. Life of other components, for example ceramic 
circuit boards, may be shortened by thermo-mechanical stresses. 
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The lifetime of plastic encapsulated parts can be much lower at high relative humidity 
than at low relative humidity. This is particularly true if high humidity occurs in 
conjunction with temperature cycling. 
Vibration and other mechanical stressors such as shock can reduce circuit life. The 
PRISM0 (Reference 3) software tool allows specification of vibration directly through 
statement of maximum acceleration or indirectly through specification of an application. 
Applications range from ground-fixed for which the vibration level is quite low to rotary 
wing aircraft for which the vibration level is quite high. 
Applied voltage is an important electrical stressor. For example, the life of capacitors 
decreases rapidly from the nominal value for applied voltage equal to or less than 50% of 
rated voltage to much less than the nominal value for applied voltage equal to rated 
voltage. PRISM0 allows the specification of operating voltage for capacitors. The life 
of other components also decreases as operating voltage approaches rated values. 
Rarely will an analyst have complete information about stressors. Often voltage levels 
can be determined from circuit schematics and vibration levels can be estimated for the 
application. Often, it will difficult to get good information about junction temperatures 
and internal temperatures. If little information is available, it may be necessary to make 
credible assumptions about temperatures and calculate a range of reliabilities. 
Sources of Failure Rate and Failure Probability Information 
There are at least four sources of data on failure rate or failure probability @e., a Sandia 
database for parts used in stockpile nuclear weapons, commercial databases, information 
from manufacturers, and models). Attributes, advantages, and limitations of these 
sources of information are discussed in this section. 
It is desirable to use failure rate data from components and environments that are as 
similar as possible to the actual components and anticipated environments. Rarely, if 
ever, are data available for the same component in an environment identical to the 
anticipated environment. Therefore, the analyst almost always has to find failure rate 
information for components as similar as possible to those in a circuit to be analyzed. 
Then the rates must be adjusted to account for differences between the parts and 
operating conditions for which there is information and the parts and operating conditions 
of interest. 
Sandia Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Database 
The reliability assessment department at Sandia maintains databases on the failure 
probabilities of electronic and other components that are or were in stockpile nuclear 
weapons. Table 2 shows the probability that the component will fail in a twenty-year 
stockpile period for several electronic components. The data are presented in this way 
because there have not been enough failures to determine failure rates. In fact, for many 
components (e.g., resistors), no failures have been observed. For such components, the 
12 
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Component 
Cable 
Capacitor, low voltage 
Capacitor, solid tantalum 
Diode 
Beam lead 
Other 
value given in Table 2 is the 50% upper confidence limit for the failure probability given 
zero failures in some number of component-weapon lifetimes. For example, the failure 
probability for resistors was obtained from the observation of no failure in approximately 
1 %E6 resistor - 20 year weapon life times. 
Probability of failure 
in 20 years 
1E-6 per strand 
4E-5 
6E-5 
9.9E-6 
l.lE-5 
Table 2. Failure probabilities from the Sandia database 
Filter 
Inductor or Trans former 
8E-5 + 1E-6 per connector- 
cable interface 
2E-4 
Resistor 
Transistor 
Beam lead 
Other 
Integrated circuit 
Large scale 
Memory 
Small scale 
5.4E-7 
9E-6 
1.2E-4 
8.8E-4 
8.6E-4 
4.1E-5 
Similar assessments are made and updated for many other nuclear weapon components. 
The data shown in Table 2 are useful in the analysis of circuits that will go through the 
sequence of manufacture, acceptance, storage, and possibly surveillance testing 
experienced by components in stockpile nuclear weapons. During manufacture and 
acceptance, weapon components are operated for a few hours to a few tens of hours. 
Once a weapon is accepted, components in it may operate continuously; intermittently, if 
the weapon is selected for surveillance tests; for a short period if the weapon is used as 
intended; or never. Most of the information used to calculate the failure probabilities 
shown in Table 2 was taken from tests on circuits and assemblies that operated during 
manufacture and acceptance testing, were in dormant storage for years, and then were 
energized for seconds or minutes. 
If the task is to calculate the reliability for a time much different than twenty years, the 
analyst will have to estimate the failure probability for the time of interest. One way to 
obtain such an estimate is to assume that the failure probability can be converted to a rate 
by dividing by twenty years or by an equivalent number of hours or other measure of 
time. However, as was stated above, the data from which the values in Table 2 were 
calculated do not support the calculation of rates. One way out of this limitation is 
discussed below. 
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In a paper published in December of 198 1, George Merren, at the time a manager in the 
Sandia reliability organization, proposed that twenty-year failure probabilities could be 
split into a part that was independent of time and a part that was proportional to time 
(Reference 1). If Merren’s proposal is accepted, the failure probability for a time other 
than twenty years is the sum of 25% of the twenty-year value and 75 % of the twenty- 
year value adjusted by the ratio of the time of interest to twenty years. The method is 
reasonable in that it yields lower failure probabilities for short missions but avoids the 
very low failure probabilities that arise if values shown in Table 2 are simply scaled by 
ratio of mission duration to twenty years. Zurn and Bierbaum used Merren’s method in 
their analyses of circuits for telemetry systems for the B6 1 and W76 programs (Reference 
2). 
Difficulties arise if the mission duration is very different from twenty years and the 
mission profile is very different from stockpile.2 An example will illustrate the 
difficulties. Suppose the method is used to estimate the failure probability for 52 ten- 
minute duration missions in one year. Assume further that the failure-determining 
stresses are not much different during operation than during storage. According to 
Merren’s method, the failure probability for each mission is 0.25 of the 20-year value 
plus a negligible amount to account for ten minutes of use. Therefore, the failure 
probability for 52 such missions is slightly more than 13 times (0.25 multiplied by 52) the 
failure probability for twenty years. This is not a reasonable result given the assumption 
that stresses during operation are not very different than those experienced during 
storage. An imaginative analyst could think of ad hoc adjustments to Merren’s method 
that would better fit the situation. Possibilities are not discussed because the example is 
given only to show that if Merren’s method is used, it must be used carefully. 
The operating conditions for many systems are very different than the conditions of 
nuclear weapon storage. Components in commercial, industrial, and military equipment 
may experience a period of dormant storage after manufacture and before use. However, 
for most such equipment, the period of dormant storage is short compared to a longer 
period of utilization during which power is applied intermittently or regularly. 
Furthermore, circuits in aircraft, particularly those in rotary wing aircraft, operate in an 
environment in which there is a lot of vibration. Circuits in vehicles, for example in a 
secure transport vehicle, may experience much more vibration, higher temperatures, and 
more extreme temperature cycling than circuits in stored weapons. The author knows of 
no general way to adjust the values in the Sandia database for conditions other than 
dormant storage. 
Reliability Analysis Center Data Bases 
The Reliability Analysis Center (RAC)3 has gathered and analyzed failure data for many 
military systems and for many conditions of use. Failure rates obtained from the data 
were once available in Mil-Handbook 217 (Reference 3), but the last update of this 
Merren did not propose using the method for conditions such as are given in the example. Those 
Reliability Analysis Center, 201 Mill Street, Rome, NY 13440. 
2 
conditions were chosen to help the reader understand the issue discussed in the text. 
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document was done in 199 1. Various documents that contain failure rates derived from 
the data are available from RAC. The results are also available in software reliability 
analysis tools such as PRISM0 (Reference 4) and RELEX (Reference 5).  
Component 
Capacitor - 0.1 pF Ceramic 
Diode - Gen. Purpose 
Inductor - Fixed Coil 
Table 3. Failure rates and failure probabilities derived from PRISMO. See text for 
definition of environment, duty cycle, and operating conditions. 
Dormant Operating 
Rate (hr-') Prob (20yr) Rate (hr-') Prob (20yr) 
8.10E-10 1.4E-04 5.90E-09 1 .OE-03 
3.70E- 10 6.5E-05 1.60E-09 2.8E-04 
3.70E-09 6.5E-04 3.70E-09 6.5E-04 
Resistor - 1/4 W Fixed Carbon 
Transistor - Low Freq., npn 
1.1 OE-09 1.9E-04 2.80E-09 4.9E-04 
8.90E-09 1.6E-03 1.60E-08 2.8E-03 
Failure rates in units of failures per calendar hour and failure probabilities for twenty 
years of use derived from PRISM0 are shown in Table 3. The values were calculated to 
illustrate the types information that can be obtained from PRISM0 and to provide 
comparison with values from the Sandia database. The data from RAC, including that in 
PRISMO, allow more specificity about the type of component and the conditions of use 
than do the data in the Sandia database. For example, there are RAC data for specific 
types of capacitors, diodes, integrated circuits, resistors, and transistors. There are also 
data for specific applications, temperatures, duty cycles, and cycles per year. The values 
shown in Table 3 were all calculated for a ground fixed application. Other possible 
applications include ground mobile, fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft, spacecraft, 
missiles, naval, and others. To calculate values for dormant storage, it was assumed that 
the temperature was 23 "C and that no power was applied. For calculation of values for 
operation, it was assumed that the ambient temperature was 23 "C, the operating 
temperature was 50 "C, the duty cycle was 50%, and there were 365 cycles per year. 
Note that for the conditions chosen, failure rate for operation is only about a factor of two 
greater than the failure rate for dormant storage. This has important implications in the 
prediction of failure rate for a mission in which equipment is turned on for a short period 
of time, turned off for a relatively long time, and then used for a relatively short time. 
The failure probability for such a mission would be underestimated if failure during the 
turned-off time were neglected. 
Probabilities of failure during twenty years of dormant storage obtained from the Sandia 
database and from PRISM0 are compared in Table 4. It is seen that the values obtained 
from the Sandia database are always smaller. For all the components shown, except 
resistors, the difference is between a factor of 3 and a factor of 13. The difference for 
resistors is a factor of 350. Factors of 3 to 13 can be explained by the procedures used to 
define and procure parts for nuclear weapons and the relatively benign conditions of 
storage. The author knows of no reason why the failure probability for resistors in 
nuclear weapons should be so much smaller than the failure probability estimated from 
PRISMO. 
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Component PRISMO 
20 years of dormant 
storage 
Capacitor 1.4E-4 
Diode 6.5E-5 
Resistor 1.9E-4 
Transistor 1.6E-3 
Note that the failure rates shown in Table 3 for operation are always larger than the rates 
for dormant storage. This difference is expected. It has an important implication for an 
analyst who is tempted to use the Sandia database for a system that will be operated 
rather than stored. It was pointed out in the previous paragraph that the Sandia database 
yields lower failure probabilities for dormant storage than does PRISMO for dormant 
storage. Therefore, use of the Sandia database will result in estimates for operating 
systems that are quite a bit lower than estimates obtained from PRISMO. 
r 
Sandia database 
20 years of dormant 
storage 
4.5E-5 
l.lE-5 
5.4E-7 
1.2E-4 
A group from TRW (Reference 6) and a group from Raytheon (Reference 7) have 
reported comparison of PRISMO failure rate predictions with field failure data. The 
TRW group reported that the predictions for an automotive circuit were pessimistic by 
about a factor of two. The Raytheon group reported that predictions for circuits for fixed 
and rotary wing aircraft were close to slightly low compared to experience. Together the 
reports increase confidence in the PRISMO methodology. 
Manufacturer Data 
Data sheets and other literature from manufacturers sometimes contain information on 
reliability or the results of tests done to evaluate reliability. For example, the information 
might show that some number of failures were observed when some number of parts, 
were subjected to an accelerated life test. The use of such information to obtain an 
estimate of the failure rate at use conditions is outside the scope of this report. It is 
particularly important to check the reasonableness of an estimated failure rate if zero 
failures were observed. If no failures were observed, calculation yields an upper bound, 
not a point estimate of the failure rate. This upper bound can be much larger than the 
actual failure rate if the number of part-hours in the test was relatively small. 
Reasonableness can often be evaluated from a comparison of the calculated rate with 
rates obtained from the Sandia database or from a tool such as PRISMO. Reasonableness 
means that there are reasons or data to support failure probabilities that make large 
contributions to the overall failure probability and to support the assignment of 
significantly different failure probabilities to similar components. 
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Failure Probabilities from Models 
Sometimes a system will contain assemblies for which the analyst cannot find reliability 
data. One way around the lack of data is to obtain circuit diagrams for the assemblies and 
calculate Case 1 reliability estimates. Even if a circuit diagram is not available, an 
analyst may be able to use engineering judgment to estimate what parts are probably in 
an assembly. For example, many switching power supplies contain a control integrated 
circuit, at least four rectifier diodes, a transformer, and at least one filter capacitor. 
Discussion with a power supply designer or reference to a trade magazine might add a 
few parts. Once an estimated parts list has been constructed, a Case 1 analysis can be 
performed. Essentially the same process can be used to estimate the failure rate for a new 
component if something is known or can be assumed about failure modes. The principal 
failure modes for most semiconductor devices are chip failure, die attach failure, wire 
bond failure, and package failure. An initial estimate of the failure rate of a new part 
could be the failure rate of an existing part that has a chip of comparable complexity in a 
similar package. The rate for the existing part could be multiplied by a factor of up to ten 
to account for lack of experience in manufacture and use of the new part. 
Analysis 
Once a reliability model and estimates of failure probabilities are available, a table 
similar to Table 1, a spreadsheet, or a tool such as PRISM0 can be used to estimate the 
failure probability for a circuit. The author recommends that the results of the analysis be 
arranged so that it is easy to determine the relative contributions from various 
components. It is not unusual to find that a few components or a few types of 
components contribute almost all the failure probability. This is particularly likely if the 
circuit contains mechanical components (e.g., switches or electro-mechanical 
components such as relays). Many such components have much higher failure rates than 
non-mechanical components. The failure probabilities for all components should be re- 
checked for consistency. This step is particularly important for the components that 
make the largest contributions to the failure probability. 
Table 5 shows the result of applying failure probabilities to the parts list given in Table 1. 
For this example, the total failure probability is not dominated by a single component. 
Table 6 shows the components rearranged in order of contribution to the failure 
probability. The rearrangement suggests that it might be worthwhile to re-check the 
failure probabilities of transistors, transformers, and capacitors, but that little 
improvement in the certainty of estimated reliability would result from more attention to 
the failure probability of resistors. Sometimes insight into the major contributors to 
failure probability can be gained if similar components are grouped together as was done 
in Tables 1, 5,  and 6. The contribution from transistors would be less obvious if each 
transistor were listed separately. This is particularly true if there are many similar 
components in a circuit or system. 
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Table 5. Case 1 Reliability Analysis Example. Failure probabilities from Table 2. 
Component Number Failure probability 
(20 years) 
Capacitor 3 4E-5 
Resistor 4 5.4E-7 
Transformer 1 2E-4* 
Transistor 2 1.2E-4 
Total failure 
probability (20 yr) 
Contribution 
1.2E-4 
2.2E-6 
2E-4 
2.4E-4 
5.43-4 
Table 6. The information in Table 5 rearranged by contribution to the failure 
probability. 
If an analyst is fortunate enough to have distributions of failure probabilities, software 
tools such as Crystal Ball (Reference 8) can be used to obtain predictions of the 
distribution for the failure probability of a circuit. 
Iteration 
As a project progresses, additional data on failure rates or failure probabilities may 
become available. For example, data may become available from accelerated life tests on 
the components that will be used in a design. Such data may corroborate or refute initial 
estimates. In either case, use of such data will increase the relevancy of estimates. 
Circuit designs may be changed because of shortfalls in the circuit design or because 
components did not meet expectations for performance, availability, reliability, or some 
other important characteristic. Particularly significant from a reliability viewpoint would 
be the use of redundant components to reduce the likelihood of failure. When such 
changes occur, the analyst will have to decide if a revised estimate of failure probability 
or of failure rate should be generated. 
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Summary 
Four issues that an analyst must resolve when asked for an estimate of the reliability of an 
electronic circuit have been discussed. The first is what constitutes circuit success and 
what constitutes failure. The second is how to construct a reliability model of the circuit. 
The third is how to obtain failure probabilities for events in the model. The fourth is how 
to calculate and review estimates of system reliability and how to display results. 
It was shown that the definition of failure, the type of analysis required, and the type of 
reliability model used are related. Three types of failure, identified as Cases 1 through 3, 
were defined. Case 1 usually applies when the analyst is &d to estimate the probability 
that a circuit will perform its intended function. The logic model for Case 1 is the 
Inclusive OR of the failure of every component in the circuit. Case 2 usually applies 
when the analyst is asked to estimate the probability that a circuit will have some 
specified incorrect or unintended output. If the failure of interest is in the set of Case 1 
failures, the Case 1 model may be adequate. However, it is often necessary to prepare a 
model that is limited to the failures of interest but that includes failure modes not always 
included in a Case 1 analysis. A short circuit between internal wires is an example of 
such a failure. Case 3 applies if a fault in the circuit under consideration causes other 
circuits to fail. The reliability model for Case 3 failure has to take into account the 
possibility that failure in one circuit will cause failure in other circuits. Models for such 
failures are specific to each system and can be quite complex. 
Sources of failure rate or failure probability values were given. Also given were methods 
that can be used to construct an estimate of failure probability when values are not 
available. Ways to calculate estimates of circuit reliability from a model and estimates of 
component failure probabilities were described. The analyst must review all results for 
reasonableness. It is useful to sort results in descending order of contribution to failure 
probability so that the major contributors can be identified. The review may show a need 
for more work on the model or on estimates of component failure probabilities. 
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